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Abstract. This research concerns the analysis of social networks using graph 
theory to find properties that can be used to determine Sybil nodes. This research 
also investigated the mixing time, which is one of the properties that many 
existing methods use for detecting Sybil attacks. The results showed that the 
mixing time does not reflect the difference between honest graphs and Sybil 
graphs. In addition, the properties of social graphs were studied and it was found 
that the average node distance is different in graphs containing Sybil nodes than 
in graphs with only honest nodes. Furthermore, the eigenvector centrality and the 
degree of Sybil nodes are correlated, while in honest nodes they are not.  
Keywords: attack graph; graph theory; social graph; social network; Sybil attack. 
1 Introduction 
Social networks play an important role in human life. They allow people to get 
connected and to share information worldwide. The profile of a user can be used 
as an artificial person. In such cases, an attacker uses this kind of network to 
assault or take advantage other people. A type of attack that is used for many 
purposes is Sybil, which means creating social bots in a social network to hijack 
or control users to penetrate the network and steal personal information, or 
share wrong information or malware [1,2].  
Sybil attacks use the properties of the social network as a weapon. A fake 
person or a fake account is created for carrying out several nefarious actions, for 
example spamming, click fraud, sharing malware, or disguising oneself as 
another person. In some cases, the fake account is created for the purpose of 
increasing views or likes to posts or fan pages. It can also be used for cyber 
bullying or playing online games [3].  
There are two different types of schemes that can be used to detect Sybil 
attacks. The first are called feature-based schemes and the second are known as 
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topology-based schemes. Both types have limitations and design-related 
problems, as detailed in the following paragraphs.  
First of all, feature-based methods rely on user-level activities and account 
details (i.e. user logs, profiles) [4]. A limitation of this approach is that an 
attacker is able to create details or profile information imitating a real user, 
which is called a cloning attack. The automated feature-based Sybil detection in 
[5,6] has shown high false negative and false positive rates due to the large 
variety of user activities and unpredictability of user behavior [3]. This 
decreases the efficiency of the method and limits its utilization on social online 
networks. 
Secondly, topology-based methods are based on the assumption that fakes can 
establish only weak attack edges with real users. Actually, with the 
advancement of computer technology, attackers are able to create strong attack 
edges with real users. Apart from that, this type of method is based on the 
assumption of fast mixing. The calculation involved with the massive size of 
online social networks is considered difficult (NP-hard) and there are no 
publications on the prevention of Sybil attacks that properly substantiate the use 
of the mixing time. 
As mentioned above, feature-based methods do not yield the desirable accuracy. 
Attackers can create fake accounts that are able to avoid detection [3]. However, 
attackers cannot make relations between fake accounts and real accounts the 
way real users do in a social network. This distinction can be used to detect 
Sybil attacks in various topology-based mechanisms. In addition, these 
mechanisms offer desirable security guarantees but there is little evidence 
supporting mixing time adoption, seeing their shortcomings in terms of 
effectiveness and efficiency on large social networks. Hence, this research used 
a topology-based method and aimed to answer the question: Can we use mixing 
time to detect Sybil nodes efficiently in large online social networks? 
Our contributions are as follows. This paper firstly proposes a process to 
analyze the properties of online social networks in terms of fast mixing, which 
is mandatory for preventing Sybil attacks on social networks. The second 
purpose was to find the properties identifying Sybil nodes in social networks 
using a topology-based scheme. This research used a social network dataset 
obtained from [7] for investigating Sybil attacks on social networks after the 
fact.  
This research investigated the mixing time property of social networks, which is 
commonly used to detect Sybil attacks. The mixing time of a social network 
containing only honest nodes tends to be faster than that of a social network 
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containing Sybil nodes. Several researchers have used the mixing time to detect 
Sybil nodes [3,8-18], but they did not sufficiently substantiate the underlying 
assumptions in their works. In this paper, we propose a process for measuring 
the mixing time in social networks using second largest eigenvalue modulus 
(SLEM). We evaluated this property to compare the mixing time value between 
honest and Sybil nodes.  
Several researches have used topology-based methods to analyze the overall 
properties of a social network in order to predict or label Sybil nodes. However, 
there has been no research that analyzed the properties of individual nodes to 
distinguish between honest and Sybil nodes. This paper proposes a way to 
investigate the properties of all nodes in a social network so that Sybil nodes 
can be differentiated from honest nodes [10,16-18,19-22].  
2 Related Works 
The structure of Sybil attacks was first described in 2002 [23]. In this type of 
attack, a malicious user creates fake identities or accounts to participate in a 
social network. Then, the malicious user will use these identities for nefarious 
purposes, for example by influencing the working of systems that rely upon 
membership of a social network, such as content voting systems and 
recommendation systems. 
One of the most popular properties applied for protection against attacks is 
using properties of graph theory to analyze suspected Sybil users. A social 
network can be represented as a graph,  = , , where  represents a node, 
or user, present in the network, and  = the reliable correlations between users 
in the social network. We can also determine the number of all users ( = ||) 
and the reliable correlation lines between users in the network (
 = ||). 
As for the characteristics of Sybil identities, it is not possible to simultaneously 
create a large number of connections between Sybil nodes and honest nodes. 
This fact could possibly be used to analyze the topology of a social network for 
detecting Sybil nodes and distinguishing them from honest nodes. The key 
factor to prevent Sybil attacks is the structure of the social graph, which mainly 
consists of the area of the graph, a Sybil region and an honest region, 
respectively.  
An honest region is a subgraph of G, which contains honest nodes connected 
with edges. A Sybil region is another subgraph, which contains Sybil nodes 
connected to one another with edges. Edges connecting an honest region and a 
Sybil region are called attack edges, as shown in Figure 1.  
188 Korkiat Kaewking  & Sirapat Boonkrong 
 
 
Figure 1 Attack edges, connecting an honest region with a Sybil region. 
The identities created by malicious users are called Sybil identities, which are 
byzantine. The goal of creating a protective mechanism against Sybil attacks is 
to make honest nodes identify other nodes as either honest or Sybil nodes [24], 
and precisely identify the identity of Sybil users. The purpose is to enable the 
system to accept honest users and reject fake users [23].  
Several researches have been done on Sybil attacks on social networks. 
Analyzing the properties of the network is one part of the investigation process. 
Sybil Guard and Sybil Limit are two of the first methods that have been 
proposed [8,9]. These methods both use the property of fast mixing in a social 
network. Yu, et al. [8] divided the area of the social network into two parts, 
namely honest and Sybil regions. Their method applies a verifier based on 
honest nodes and uses the random walk property to find a random route of 
nodes. This random route is used to detect nodes as either honest or Sybil. A 
node is considered an honest node when the random route of this node intersects 
with the random route of the verifier node (in the random route, a similar 
stationary distribution is determined for investigation). Yu, et al. [9] improved 
this process by using the last tail, i.e. the edges that connect the last node of the 
random route, instead of the intersection for consideration. If there is overlap, it 
means that the considered node is an honest node. However, this method has 
some problems. If a Sybil node is adjacent to a verified node, this may lead to 
an error of operation in the random walk, or if the random walk is too short, the 
last tail of the considered node and the verified node never overlap.  
SybilInfer [10] is a prevention method that uses all information in a network 
and uses the random walk method on the mixing time together with Bayesian 
inference to identify Sybil nodes. This method is based on the assumption that 
the mixing time of a network graph containing Sybil nodes is slower than that 
of a network graph of honest nodes. However, this method was only tested with 
a small amount of information and there is the possibility that, in the case of 
larger networks, bottle necks could occur, leading to errors of operation. 
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Besides, only the property of fast mixing was applied, which may affect the 
method’s efficiency.  
Gatekeeper and SumUp [11,12] are decentralized Sybil investigation methods 
based on Sybil Limit. This process uses graph properties such as the mixing 
time as part of the investigation. Furthermore, the Ticket Distribution 
Admission Control Process was added to allow each node to consider whether 
other nodes are reliable or not. This process distributes tickets to all nodes in the 
network (tickets have a specified value and are assigned to the initial node) 
using the breadth-first search (BFS) method. In BFS, nodes at the same level do 
not send tickets to each other but send them only to lower-level nodes. 
Afterward, any node in the network will be defined as honest or Sybil by 
comparing the ticket value of each node with a threshold value. However, this 
method has a problem with the ticket distribution. In the case of a single source, 
it has only the root node available for distribution and the ticket will encounter 
problems when there are many nodes present. Here, the attacker could design 
strategies to attack only the ticket source. Moreover, if the degree of the 
considered node is low, it will lead to a decision process error.  
Researches [13-15] studied the characteristics of social graphs and found that 
the nodes of a social graph can be used to find communities. The limitation of 
these publications is that information from the whole network is required, for 
example the numbers of nodes, edges, Sybil nodes and honest nodes, for use in 
the analytical process, which may lead to practical problems in extended social 
networks.  
Cao, et al. proposed Sybil Rank [3], while Integro [16] and Sybil Radar [17] 
improved this method by applying machine learning. The researchers assumed 
that social networks have only a small number of victim nodes. However, in 
reality there are many. As for the system’s performance, its accuracy decreased 
when the number of attack edges increased. These methods also have other 
limitations. For example, it is possible that the trust value of the honest nodes is 
equal to that of the Sybil nodes when propagating the trust value from the initial 
node to a stationary distribution. 
SybilExposer [19] divides the social network into an honest community and a 
Sybil community by analyzing the degree of each node. The researcher assumed 
that the degrees inside and outside of the Sybil community are lower than the 
degrees inside and outside the honest community. However, if the number of 
nodes in a community is not large and they are not analyzed node by node, the 
method is prone to errors. 
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SybilWalk [20] calculates the score of each node by applying the random walk 
property to identify Sybil nodes. A label is added to the passing-through node. 
However, it is not clear how the process of labeling Sybil nodes is initiated. 
SybilSCAR [21] creates local rules for detecting Sybil nodes by applying the 
random walk technique and loopy belief propagation. A training data set is used 
to create rules for all nodes and distribute the node label values in the network. 
However, this method has a performance problem. If the number of attack edges 
in the network increases, a noticeable delay occurs. SybilBlind [22] adopts the 
SybilSCAR method by randomly selecting the training data set instead of 
manually selecting it. The authors also applied a homophily-entropy aggregator 
to calculate the possibility of Sybil nodes. However, this method has a problem 
with randomizing the nodes of the training data set, which is not actually 
representative of the node population in the network. 
SmartWalk [18] identifies Sybil nodes by calculating the mixing time with a 
supervised-learning technique. With this method it is not feasible to calculate 
the mixing time value of every node in a network. This method uses a subset of 
nodes as the training data set, after which the mixing time value is calculated. 
However the authors did not explain how the nodes for the training data set 
were selected. Moreover, using only the mixing time may cause a performance 
problem. 
There are some studies that have investigated mixing time measurement on 
social networks. Mohaisen, et al. [4] measured the mixing time of several social 
networks using SLEM but without considering the difference between directed 
and undirected node relations. Ref. [25] did use the direction of node relations, 
following previous works, to measure the mixing time. However, this work did 
not sufficiently explain the difference in mixing time between honest and Sybil 
graphs. Dellamico & Roudier [26] studied the way to measure mixing time in 
four big social networks, i.e. Advogato, DBLP, Epinions and OpenPGP, but did 
not explain the techniques used in their measurements.  
Since the mixing time has yet not been applied to real social networks, it is 
uncertain if measuring it can really indicate Sybil nodes. Therefore, this 
research made an attempt to prove whether a not the mixing time is an effective 
indicator of Sybil attacks on a real social network. 
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3 Experimental Setup 
3.1 Consideration of Mixing Time in Sybil Attacks on Social 
Networks 
Several Sybil defense mechanisms exploit the mixing time property. The 
mixing time of an online social network is a way to measure the time needed in 
a random walk through the social network from the starting point to a stationary 
distribution. When the mixing time of a social network tends to be fast, it is 
called fast mixing [8]. However this property has been used widely without 
careful measurement of the mixing time. SybilGuard [8], Sybil Limit [9] and 
SybilInfer [10] are Sybil detection approaches that have adopted the mixing 
time property. This section will discuss the measurement of mixing time in 
detail. 
A social network can be expressed in the form of a graph. We define deg  as 
the degree of node  ∈  and transition probability matrix  =  with size  ×  , where  is the probability of the transition from node  to node . 
  = 

             !ℎ#   is connected to                                 0                      !ℎ#   is not connected to                           
In the stochastic process of a Markov chain, the amount of time to reach a 
stationary distribution of P is equal to + = +. The mixing time of a Markov 
chain it is equal to T, which is the shortest time or process from random walk to 
stationary distribution under distance variation (,), as shown in Eq. (1). 
 -, = 
./ 
01: |+ − +4|< ,6     (1) 
where + is stationary distribution, + is the distribution at starting node ,  4 
is the transition probability matrix after walking time t, and |+ − +4| is the 
total distance variation. The speed of the mixing time in a Markov chain is 
called fast mixing and can be calculated with Equation -, = 789:. 
The mixing time value can be determined by two theories, which are stationary 
distribution (+) and second largest eigenvalue modulus (SLEM). + can be 
expressed in terms of a vector as in Eq. (2). 
 + = ; <=>    => …  @=> A            (2) 
In the case of SLEM, the eigenvalue of the transition probability matrix is 
calculated, where P is equal to  when 1 ≤  ≤  is a real number, which is 
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ordered as 1 =  > = ≥ ⋯ ≥ GH ≥ G > −1. Therefore, the second largest 
eigenvalue (µ) is equal to μ = 
./|=|, |GH|. The mixing time -, 
calculated using this equation is similar to the one calculated by Eq. (3).  
 
J
=HJ 89: =K ≤ -, ≤ LMNGOLMNP
<QRHJ            (3) 
In this work, we computed SLEM by following Eq. (3) for finding the mixing 
time of a social graph. Calculation of this equation is feasible for large social 
graphs [26]. Calculation of Eqs. (1) and (2), on the other hand, is not feasible 
for social graphs with millions of nodes. 
Even though several Sybil defense mechanisms that were applied in 
experiments on social networks use this property, they were not aimed at 
measuring the mixing time and did not clearly explain the adoption of this 
property. Hence, this research aimed to find the mixing time of social graphs 
using Eq. (3) in order to test the assumption of using the mixing time to detect 
Sybil attacks in social networks.  
This part of the research dealt with measuring the mixing time of a social 
network using Eq. (3), comparing an honest graph and a Sybil graph using data 
sets from [7], as shown in Table 1. The datasets consist of information from 
Twitter and contain fake accounts as well as normal accounts. The data were 
used to investigate the mixing time of social networks. The 5 datasets are 
divided into 2 sets of normal users (TFP, E13) and 3 sets of fake users (INT, 
FSF, TWT). 
Table 1 Datasets used in the experiment. 
Dataset Nodes Edges Graph Type 
E13 (elections 2013) 34,352 48,156 honest Graph 1 
TFP (the fake project) 143,138 241,374 honest Graph 2 
INT (intertwitter) 42,058 517,486 Sybil Graph 1 
FSF (fastfollowerz) 12,541 253,027 Sybil Graph 2 
TWT (twittertechnology) 63,820 729,840 Sybil Graph 3 
In this research, Python was used for calculating the mixing time and 
investigating the properties of the graphs. Processing was done in three steps. 
Firstly, data pre-processing was done, which is the conversion of the 
information from the social network to a social graph using the analysis tool 
Gephi. This was carried out in order to create edges connecting the nodes in the 
datasets. The transition probability matrix of the social graph was then 
generated using Python. The second step was the data processing step, which is 
the calculation of the mixing time. This was done by using the second largest 
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eigenvalue modulus (SLEM) on the transition matrix of the social network 
datasets according to Eq. (3). When computing the SLEM, we used the lower 
bound of Eq. (3) to bind the mixing time of the social graphs. It is possible to 
measure values of large social networks [4]. With Eq. (3), we assigned the 
distance variation (,), which equaled 0.05 to 0.50, to show the possibilities of 
the calculated value. (In fact, the distance variation can also be larger than 0.50 
but there would not be an obvious difference in mixing time between the social 
graphs). The variable of the initial point and the stationary distribution of the 
random walk in the social graph were set. Finally, in the third step we compared 
the mixing time of the social graphs, as shown in Table 1.  
We created a function to calculate the SLEM and to investigate the mixing time 
by creating networks of normal users and creating networks of Sybil nodes by 
simulating a random correlation between normal users and fake users. This 
correlation was used to create the connecting edges between the nodes. The 
numbers of attack edges was set at 1,000 to 10,000 to distinguish sparse and 
dense attack edges. After that, the network datasets were imported using this 
function. The mixing time was then calculated for each dataset. 
3.2 Consideration of Node Distance for Detecting Sybil Attacks in 
Social Networks 
In order to find the distance between nodes in a network, crawling techniques 
are carried out. These techniques can be divided into two types: the random 
walk technique and the graph traversal technique. The random walk technique is 
used to find the mixing time, where each node can be selected repeatedly. The 
graph traversal technique is used to find the node distance, where each node can 
be selected only once [27].  
Node distance is the number of edges that connect the starting node and the 
terminal node. Generally, breadth-first search is used to find the distance 
between nodes. Nevertheless, a limitation of this technique appears when it is 
applied to two nodes in a social graph. That is, the distance between two nodes 
with different subgraphs is often smaller than the distance between two nodes 
with the same subgraph. To solve this problem, depth-first search  (DFS) can be 
used [28]. Because the number of connecting lines or edges between subgraphs 
is often low and BFS is unable to give comparable distances, DFS does not give 
the shortest path. The path obtained from DFS is far longer than the one 
obtained from BFS; the time used to find the distance is equal to 7 + . In 
this research, we considered node distance for investigating the difference 
between honest graphs and Sybil graphs.  
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We assumed that the structural characteristics of a social network may influence 
the distance between nodes, revealing the difference between honest graphs and 
Sybil graphs by comparing the values of the distance between the starting node 
and the terminal node. An experiment was conducted to test this assumption. 
Firstly, we determined the starting node in the region of an honest graph and the 
terminal node in the region of an honest graph by using the datasets of honest 
Graph 1 and honest Graph 2. Secondly, the starting node was set in the region 
of an honest graph and the terminal node was set in the region of a Sybil graph 
using the dataset of honest Graph 1 to create a random correlation with the 
dataset of Sybil Graph 1. 
The operating steps were as follows. First, social graphs from the datasets were 
created using Gephi. This analysis tool was used to create edges connecting the 
nodes in the datasets. Secondly, a possible pathway between the starting node 
and the terminal node was found. In this experiment, we used Python as the tool 
for this process and used the datasets by randomly selecting data from Table 1, 
as shown in Table 2. Finding the node pathway in the social networks was done 
by using depth-first search.  
The experiment was divided into two parts. First, the starting node and the 
terminal node were randomized to act as normal accounts in an honest graph. 
Then, the starting node was randomized to act as a normal account and the 
terminal node was randomized to act as an account in a Sybil graph. Thereafter, 
finding the possible pathway was carried out using the developed program. The 
distances between the nodes of the mentioned pathway were collected for 100 
rounds to find the trend of distances. After getting the outcome, the result was 
analyzed. 
3.3 Investigating the Correlation of Properties of Nodes in Social 
Networks 
The previous part of this research focused on properties that can distinguish the 
difference between an honest graph and a Sybil graph based on finding 
pathways. However, these properties can only be applied when the structure of 
the social network is known. Therefore, this section focuses on finding 
additional properties of social networks by considering specific properties of the 
nodes in order to find the difference between honest nodes and Sybil nodes. 
This experiment was specifically designed to investigate the properties of nodes 
in social networks that can be used to identify Sybil nodes.  
First a social graph was created using Gephi, after which it was analyzed. The 
datasets in Table 1 were used to find the following node properties: degree, 
clustering coefficient, page rank, eigenvector centrality, betweenness centrality, 
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eccentricity, closeness centrality and modularity class. The Python tool 
NetworkX was used to obtain the values of these properties. Afterward, a 
comparison between the obtained properties, using linear regression analysis 
between honest and Sybil nodes in the social graphs. 
In this research, we used the degree and the eigenvector centrality to find the 
correlation between the nodes. The value of eigenvector centrality was first 
proposed in 1987 [29,30]. It is based on the degree of a node. A node has a high 
eigenvector centrality when it is connected with a high-degree node. This value 
indicates the influence of the node in the social graph. This has the benefit of 
identifying node centrality in a graph [31]. Eigenvector centrality is different 
from the degree of centrality, which only considers the number of adjacent 
nodes. Eigenvector centrality also considers the centrality of the adjacent nodes, 
each connected node having different importance. Highly influential nodes in 
the network are considered more important than other nodes [11]. The 
eigenvector centrality value is also used, as shown in Eqs. (4) and (5). 
 T/ = /  (4) 
 / = ∑ ./GV       (5) 
  = 1, … . ,  
where A is the adjacency matrix of the graph, . is 1 when  and  are 
connected with each other, otherwise it is equal to 0, and  is the largest 
eigenvalue of T, and  is the number of nodes in the graph. For examining the 
characteristics of the Sybil graph we used eigenvector centrality to find 
correlations with other graph properties. These correlations were then used to 
analyze and create the equation for detecting Sybil nodes. 
4 Results and Discussion 
4.1 Results of Considering Mixing Time for Investigating Sybil 
Attacks in Social Networks 
Table 2 shows the SLEM values of the 5 datasets calculated by determining the 
attack edges between Sybil and honest nodes from 1,000 to 10,000 edges, 
respectively. The results show that when the number of attack edges was 1,000 
the SLEM value of all datasets had the highest value. In contrast, when the 
number of attack edges was 10,000, the SLEM value of all datasets had the 
lowest value. It can therefore be concluded that the SLEM value decreased 
when the number of attack edges increased.  
196 Korkiat Kaewking  & Sirapat Boonkrong 
Figure 2 shows the trend of the lower bound of the mixing time calculated by 
Eq. (3); the number of attack edges between Sybil and honest nodes was set 
from 1,000 to 10,000 edges, respectively. The result showed that when the 
number of attack edges was 1,000, the mixing time of the networks of all 
datasets was the highest. When the number of attack edges was 10,000, the 
mixing times of all datasets was the lowest. This means that the mixing time of 
each dataset decreased when the number of attack edges increased, which 
corresponds with a decrement in SLEM value.  
Table 2 SLEM value of networks used in this experiment. 
Attack Edges 
SLEM 
honest 1 honest 2 Sybil 1 Sybil 2 Sybil 3 
1000 0.968327 0.987773 0.968178 0.988346 0.987539 
2000 0.968135 0.975584 0.964932 0.977225 0.976301 
3000 0.957366 0.964559 0.961403 0.966390 0.965791 
4000 0.953293 0.956646 0.955136 0.958499 0.957316 
5000 0.946594 0.949208 0.943882 0.950784 0.949334 
6000 0.947649 0.947222 0.935095 0.944085 0.945101 
7000 0.938962 0.943225 0.931938 0.942543 0.939153 
8000 0.927852 0.938252 0.918350 0.934692 0.937845 
9000 0.928453 0.933872 0.916261 0.930352 0.927025 
10000 0.926849 0.926985 0.913402 0.924909 0.930901 
When considering the mixing time of each network in this experiment, the 
following was found. Firstly, when the number of attack edges was equal to 
1,000, the mixing times of honest Graph 1 and Sybil Graph 1 tended to be the 
lowest. Secondly, when the number of attack edges was over 3,000, the mixing 
time was not different between the honest graph and the Sybil graph. Figure 3 
shows that when the number of attack edges increased, the mixing time of all 
datasets decreased and there was no difference between the honest graph and 
the Sybil graph.  
The results of this research showed that the number of attack edges affected the 
mixing time of the social networks of the 5 datasets. When the number of attack 
edges increased, the mixing time decreased. When considering Eq. (3), the 
results show that the SLEM value (X) was calculated from the eigenvalue 
obtained from the adjacency matrix of the network. This means that when the 
social network tended towards a denser graph, it affected the calculation of the 
eigenvalue, which in turn influenced the mixing time.  




Figure 2 Trend of mixing time, when total variation = 0.05-0.50. 
When considering the structure of the social networks, it was found that when 
using a random walk from the initial node to a stationary distribution, the 
chance to go to a stationary distribution in a network containing dense edges 
was higher compared to a network containing sparse edges. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the mixing time depends on the structural characteristics and the 
density of the edges in the network. The difference between an honest graph and 
a Sybil graph, when considering mixing time, can be observed when the density 
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of the edges between an honest and a Sybil region is high. Meanwhile, a low 
density of edges does not show any difference. Therefore, the mixing time does 
not significantly reveal the difference between honest and Sybil graphs. This 
confirms one of our conjectures that the mixing time alone cannot distinguish 
honest and Sybil graphs. 
 
Figure 3 Trend of mixing time, when attack edges increased. 
4.2 Results of Node Distance Consideration in Sybil Attacks on 
Social Networks 
Figure 4 shows the distances from the starting node to the terminal nodes of the 
datasets with the number of attack edges from 1,000 to 10,000 edges, 
respectively. The experiment was run 100 rounds, after which the average node 
distances were calculated. The results show the difference in node distance 
distribution between the datasets when both the initial and the terminal node 
were honest (in the honest graphs) and when the initial node was an honest node 
and the terminal node was a Sybil node (in the Sybil graphs).  
The dataset of the honest graphs showed that their average node distance was 
lower than that of the Sybil graphs. Table 3 shows the average distances for the 
datasets in this experiment. The results show that the average distance between 
the nodes of honest Graph 2 was the lowest, i.e. equal to 2 hops. Meanwhile, 
Sybil Graph 1 had the highest value. Moreover, the average node distances of 
all honest graphs were lower than those of the Sybil graphs. 
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Figure 4 Trend of node distance as the number of attack edges increases. 
Table 3 Node distance of each dataset. 
Attack Edges Node Distance 
honest 1 honest 2 Sybil 1 Sybil 2 Sybil 3 
1000 4 2 2394 1260 1658 
2000 4 2 2476 1665 1718 
3000 4 2 2554 1776 1964 
4000 4 2 2770 1793 2104 
5000 4 2 3001 1819 2173 
6000 4 2 3583 1884 2290 
7000 4 2 5122 1974 2417 
8000 4 2 7606 2059 2508 
9000 4 2 8763 2068 5000 
10000 4 2 9506 2311 5834 
Although a clear difference in mixing time could not be observed, it could be 
seen that when the structural characteristics of the network changed, it led to a 
difference in the mixing times of the random walk. Therefore, an experiment 
was done to find out the differences between honest and Sybil graphs with 
different topologies. This experiment used the depth-first search principle to 
investigate the pathway from the starting node to the terminal node. The results 
showed that when the terminal node was in the area of a Sybil graph, the 
distance of the targeted pathway was longer than in an honest graph. This was 
because Sybil graphs have a lower clustering coefficient when compared to 
honest graphs. Hence, in the first case, finding the pathway to the target requires 
more hops.  
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Furthermore, Table 4 showed the average clustering coefficients of the online 
social networks used in this experiment. It can be seen that all three Sybil 
graphs had a lower average clustering coefficient compared to the honest 
graphs. This means that most of the nodes in the Sybil graphs had less direct 
connections when compared to the honest graphs. Therefore, according to this 
experiment, we found that the difference in topology of honest and Sybil graphs 
affects the node distance distribution when using the depth-first search method. 
This method shows a difference between honest and Sybil graphs, which 
implies that using this method could help distinguish Sybil nodes from honest 
nodes. 
Table 4 Average clustering coefficient. 
Dataset Average Clustering Coefficient 
honest Graph 1 0.048428 
honest Graph 2 0.017501 
Sybil Graph 3 0.000075 
Sybil Graph 4 0.000175 
Sybil Graph 5 0.000413 
 
4.3 Results of Correlation between Properties of Nodes in 
Networks  
After investigating the correlation between the properties of nodes using the 
linear regression method, it was found that the two datasets of honest networks 
did not exhibit any transfer function. Meanwhile, the three datasets of the Sybil 
networks revealed node properties with a correlation, i.e. eigenvector centrality 
and node degree. Table 5 shows the Pearson correlation and correlation 
efficiency of these two values. Scatter plots of the datasets were created to show 
the correlation between these values, as shown in Figure 5.  
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5 Scatter plot of the correlation between degree and eigenvector 
centrality of honest graphs (a) and Sybil graphs (b). 
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Table 5 Pearson correlation between degree and eigenvector centrality. 
Dataset Pearson Correlation R2 
honest Graph 1 0.202026378 0.0408 
honest Graph 2 0.079120808 0.0063 
Sybil Graph 1 0.996158892 0.9999966063437 
Sybil Graph 2 0.996230596 0.999999896501
Sybil Graph 3 0.991001511 0.999997301207 
When considering the Pearson correlation between the degree and eigenvector 
centrality of the three Sybil graphs, it can be seen that the Pearson correlation 
and correlation coefficients were close to 1, meaning that node degree and 
eigenvector centrality in the mentioned datasets had a positive correlation. 
Meanwhile, the Pearson correlation of two honest graphs was close to 0, 
meaning that the properties of the two datasets had no positive correlation. 
4.4 Efficiency Measurement  
According to the results in Section 4.3, we created an equation to predict the 
Sybil trend of nodes from the variables of the three Sybil datasets by applying a 
transfer function with linear regression, as shown in Eq. (6):  
 Y = Z/                    
 Z = Y /[  (6) 
when 
 Z  =  the desired parameter (value tended to be Sybil) 
 y = eigenvector centrality 
  /  =  degree 
From Eq. (6), we created a novel equation by replacing the Y value with the 
equation of eigenvector centrality and / with the equation to find the value of 
node degree, as shown in Eq. (7). 
 \ = 1 ][ ∑ ./GV ∑ .GV^      (7) 
 \ tends to be Sybil, when _4`a ≤ \ ≤ _./4`a 
When  
 \  = the value of Sybil node i 
 _4`a = regulation for the lowest consideration 
 _./4`a = regulation for the highest consideration  ]  = largest eigenvalue of the network 
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  .  = equal to 1 when node i and node j are adjacent nodes 
 /   = eigenvector centrality of node j 
   = total number of nodes in the network 
  
This was tested in an experiment using the information from the honest and 
Sybil graphs of the social networks, containing 456,312 nodes in total, as shown 
in Table 1. The appropriateness of the values of _4`a and _./4`a was tested 
by considering false negatives, MAE, and RMSE. The results are shown in 
Table 6.  
The results show that when using Eq. (7) to calculate the Sybil node trend, the 
most suitable value of _4`a was 0.00074 and the most suitable value of _./4`a was 0.0013. Once these two values were considered as Sybil nodes, the 
accuracy was also measured. The false negative value was 0.756% with MAE = 
0.211, and RMSE = 0.459. If the mean absolute value (MAE) is small, it means 
that the method can be used to identify Sybil nodes. In this case, the value was 
0.211. If the value of root mean square error (RMSE) is equal to zero, it means 
that there was no deviation in the experiment. In this case, the RMSE was equal 
to 0.459. However, these values were obtained by information used only in this 
research. 
Table 6 MAE, RMSE, FN of Social Network in this Experiment when _4`a = 0.00071 − 0.00079 and _./4`a = 0.0013. 
efghij eklhij MAE RMSE False Negative (%) 
0.00071 0.0013 0.2137 0.462277 0.756483 
0.00072 0.0013 0.213595 0.462163 0.756483 
0.00073 0.0013 0.213166 0.461699 0.756483 
0.00074 0.0013 0.211057 0.45941 0.756483 
0.00075 0.0013 0.218692 0.467646 12.33332 
0.00076 0.0013 0.226154 0.475557 22.98884 
0.00077 0.0013 0.226523 0.475944 24.06028 
0.00078 0.0013 0.216258 0.465035 25.05813 
0.00079 0.0013 0.208287 0.456385 25.26418 
5 Conclusion 
In this work, first a process to analyze the properties of online social networks 
in terms of fast mixing was proposed, which is mandatory for detecting Sybil 
attacks on social networks. Existing Sybil defense mechanisms assume that 
honest networks are fast mixing while Sybil networks are not. One of our main 
findings was that the mixing time alone cannot be used in a Sybil defense 
scheme. An experiment was carried out to test this property and it was found 
that the structural characteristics of a network affect the mixing time of its graph 
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in such a way that is not always possible to see the difference between an honest 
graph and a Sybil graph.  
The second aim of this research was to find properties that can be used to 
identify Sybil nodes in social networks using a topology-based scheme. It was 
found that the average node distance in a graph that contains only honest nodes 
is lower than that in a graph containing Sybil nodes. Thus, this property can 
reveal the difference between honest and Sybil graphs. It was also found that the 
correlation between two other properties, i.e. eigenvector centrality and degree 
of node, is different in a Sybil graph than in an honest graph. From this 
correlation, an equation was produced in order to detect Sybil nodes. The results 
showed that the equation was able to distinguish between Sybil and honest 
nodes and hence these two properties can act as factors to protect against Sybil 
attacks.  
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